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Abstract
The linear complementarity problem, LCP (q,M), is defined as follows. For given M ∈
R
m×m, q ∈ Rm, find z such that q + Mz ≥ 0, z ≥ 0, z⊺(q + Mz) = 0, or certify that
there is no such z. It is well known that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium for a bimatrix
game (2-NASH) can be formulated as a linear complementarity problem (LCP). In addition, 2-
NASH is known to be complete in the complexity class PPAD (Polynomial-time Parity Argument
Directed). However, the ingeniously constructed reduction (which is designed for any PPAD prob-
lem) is very complicated, so while of great theoretical significance, it is not practical for actually
solving an LCP via 2-NASH, and it may not provide the potential insight that can be gained from
studying the game obtained from a problem formulated as an LCP (e.g. market equilibrium).
The main goal of this paper is the construction of a simple explicit reduction of any LCP (q,M)
that can be verified as belonging to PPAD via the graph induced by the generic Lemke algorithm
with some positive covering vector d, to a symmetric 2-NASH. In particular, any endpoint of this
graph (with the exception of the initial point of the algorithm) corresponds to either a solution
or to a so-called secondary ray. Thus, an LCP problem is verified as belonging to PPAD if any
secondary ray can be used to construct, in polynomial time, a certificate that there is no solution
to the problem. We achieve our goal by showing that for any M, q and positive d satisfying a
certain nondegeneracy assumption with respect to M , we can simply and directly construct a
symmetric 2-NASH whose Nash equilibria correspond one-to-one to the end points of the graph
induced by LCP (q,M) and the Lemke algorithm with a covering vector d. We note that for a
given M the reduction works for all positive d with the exception of a subset of measure 0.
1 Introduction
The linear complementarity problem LCP (q,M) is defined as
For given q ∈Rm, M ∈Rm×m, find z ∈Rm such that q +Mz ≥ 0, z ≥ 0, z⊺(q +Mz) = 0.
The LCP is notable for its wide range of applications, from well understood and relatively easy to
solve problems, such as linear and convex quadratic programming problems, to NP-hard problems. A
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2major effort in LCP theory had been the study of variants of Lemke’s algorithm, a Simplex-like vertex
following algorithm. In particular, for a given positive covering vector d, the Lemke(d) algorithm
goes through a path of adjacent vertices of the ‘extended’ LCP (q,M) (denoted by ELCP (d, q,M))
where d is attached to M with an artificial variable z0. Assuming (without loss of generality) that
ELCP (d, q,M) is nondegenerate, Lemke(d) is guaranteed to terminate in a finite number of steps
with either a solution to the original problem or with a secondary ray of ELCP (d, q,M). If the
secondary rays can certify (in polynomial time) that there is no solution to LCP (q,M), we say that
the problem is Lemke(d)-resolvable. One of the major themes of LCP research over the years has
been the search for classes of matrices M and covering vectors d for which LCP (q,M) is Lemke(d)-
resolvable for all q. Several such classes (usually applicable for all d > 0) were identified (see e.g.
[CPS92], [Mur88] and the references therein).
The introduction of the PPAD (Polynomial-time Parity Argument Directed) complexity class
in [Pap94] provides an effective and elegant framework for analyzing the complexity of Lemke(d)-
resolvable linear complementarity problems since, in general, the directed graph induced by the
Lemke(d) algorithm for a given LCP (q,M) can be used to verify the membership of the problem
in PPAD. We say in this case that the problem is Lemke(d) PPAD-verified. This development is
significant with respect to LCP theory since it has been shown in [MP91] that if PPAD is NP-hard
then NP = CoNP, lending support to the long standing informal belief that LCPs resolvable by
Lemke(d) algorithm are in some way special.
What makes the class PPAD particularly interesting is the fact that several well known problems,
such as finding a Brouwer fixed-point, were identified in [Pap94] as PPAD-complete. The discovery,
in a string of papers ([DP05], [DP05a], [CD05] and [CD05a]), that finding a Nash equilibrium of
a bimatrix game (2-NASH) is PPAD-complete has significant consequences in the context of LCP
theory. It has been known since the early days of LCP research that the 2-NASH problem can
be formulated as an LCP with roughly the same size and with the coefficient matrix belonging
to one of several well known classes resolvable by Lemke(d) algorithm. The fact that 2-NASH is
PPAD-complete means that any LCP (q,M) verifiable as a member in PPAD (including all classes
that contain 2-NASH) can be reduced to a 2-NASH problem. However, the known reduction is
quite complicated. It requires several stages that involve reducing the given LCP (q,M) to finding
an approximate Brouwer fixed point of an appropriate function, followed by reducing the latter to
3-graphical NASH (using small polymatrix games to simulate the computation of certain simple
arithmetic operations), and finally, reducing the 3-graphical NASH to 2-NASH1. While there seems
to be no discussion in the vast literature on LCP suggesting the possibility that Lemke(d) PPAD-
verified LCPs can be reduced to 2-NASH, the discovery that 2-NASH is PPAD-complete motivated
us to search for the existence of a direct simple reduction of such problems to 2-NASH.
The main result of this paper is the introduction of a direct, simple reduction of almost any
Lemke(d) PPAD-verified linear complementarity problems to a symmetric 2-NASH. In fact, we
introduce a stronger result as follows. Consider a generic Lemke(d) LCP (q,M) (which we call
LLCP (d, q,M)) whose ‘solutions’ are defined to be either actual solutions of LCP (q,M) or secondary
rays of ELCP (d, q,M). Obviously this problem2 is Lemke(d) PPAD-verified. Through a series of
steps we show how to construct a symmetric bimatrix game whose equilibria correspond one-to-one
1A clear ‘bird’s-eye view’ description of the reduction can be found in [DGP09].
2Where, as we assume without loss of generality, its extended form, ELCP (d, q,M), is nondegenerate.
3to the ‘solutions’ of LLCP (d, q,M). The point is that if LCP (q,M) is Lemke(d) PPAD-verified,
the Nash equilibria of the constructed bimatrix game correspond to solutions (or certifications for
infeasibility) of the given problem, which means that the constructed bimatrix game properly resolves
an LCP (q,M) if it is Lemke(d)-verified.
We begin by reviewing the Lemke(d) algorithm (in Section 2) and bimatrix games (in Section
3). Next, we introduce (in Section 4) the complexity class PPAD, and briefly discuss the no-
tion of Lemke(d) PPAD-verified LCPs. In addition, we present the majority of matrix classes
known to be Lemke(d) PPAD-verified, and identify a number of matrix classes whose corresponding
LCPs are PPAD-complete. We conclude the introductory sections by introducing (in Section 5)
LLCP (d, q,M), the generic Lemke(d) LCP (q,M).
Our main results are presented in sections 6-8. We start by introducing in Section 6 a very simple
reduction of LCP (q,M), whereM belongs to a class of matrices for which a solution is guaranteed to
exist for all q, to a symmetric 2-NASH. The cost matrix of the resulting bimatrix game is composed of
M with an extra row and column. In particular, we show that the solutions of the given LCP (q,M)
correspond one-to-one to the Nash equilibria which use with positive probability for the pure strategy
corresponding to the extra column of the cost matrix. Moreover, we show that the Nash equilibria
which do not use the pure strategy corresponding to the extra column of the cost matrix of the
resulting game correspond one-to-one to the so-called ‘secondary directions’ of ELCP (e, q,M). Note
that at this stage we address only e - the vector of all ones - as a covering vector, and that we do not
reach yet our goal as the reduction may produce secondary directions rather than secondary rays.3
In Section 7, we extend the basic reduction above (by considering an augmented problem) so
that the constructed bimatrix game produces either a solution for LCP (q,M), a secondary ray for
ELCP (e, q,M), or a non-zero vector which is a solution to LCP (e,M) (and is actually also a special
case of a secondary direction of ELCP (e, q,M)).
In Section 8, we show that if a secondary direction generated by the bimatrix game constructed
in the previous section is a nondegenerate solution of LCP (e,M), we can use it to compute, in
strongly polynomial time either a solution for LCP (q,M) or a secondary ray for ELCP (e, q,M);
thus showing that the constructed bimatrix game indeed provides a ‘solution’ for LLCP (e, q,M).
In Section 9 we extend the results of the previous section to accommodate the reduction of
any LLCP (d, q,M) for which d > 0 and LCP (d,M) is nondegenerate; thereby achieving our goal
of showing that any LCP (q,M) which is Lemke(d) PPAD-verified (satisfying our nondegeneracy
assumption as stated above) can be reduced to a symmetric 2-NASH. We note that for any given
M and q, the reduction is workable for all positive covering vectors with the exception of a finite
number of sets of measure 0.
The constructed reduction is particulary useful since it provides a bijection between the reducible
LCPs and their corresponding 2-NASH problems. In particular, the simplicity of the reduction and
its bijection property allows for the practical use of the results of the extensive research on ‘non
Lemke type’ 2-NASH algorithms for solving (or enumerating the solutions of) reducible LCPs . In
addition, these reductions can be applied to investigate properties of solutions of reducible LCP
via known properties of the associated 2-NASH problems. We discuss these subjects together with
3A ray of ELCP (d, q,M) is an unbounded edge of ELCP (d, q,M) which includes its endpoint (a vertex of
ELCP (q,M)) together with a direction vector.
4additional concluding remarks in Section 10.
Throughout the paper we denote by e vectors all of whose entries are 1. Given a matrix A, we
denote by Ai. the i-th row of A, by A.j the j-th column of A, and by Aij the ij-th entry of A. We
denote by Rm×n,Rm×n+ , and R
m×n
++ the space of m × n real matrices, the space of nonnegative
m×n real matrices, and the space of positive m×n real matrices, respectively. Whenever n = 1 we
abbreviate Rm×n to Rm, and whenever m = n = 1 we abbreviate Rm×n to R.
2 LCP and Lemke’s algorithm
Given M ∈Rm×m, q ∈Rm, the linear complementarity problem, LCP (q,M), is defined as
find z ∈Rm such that
q +Mz ≥ 0, z ≥ 0, (1a)
z⊺(q +Mz) = 0. (1b)
Note that (1a)–(1b) imply
zi(qi +Mi.z) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m. (1c)
We denote by FEA(q,M) the set of all z satisfying (1a), and by SOL(q,M) the set of all z
satisfying (1a) and (1b).
In this section we present the generic Lemke algorithm (the so-called Scheme I - see [CPS92],
4.4.5). Given LCP (q,M) we define its extended version, with a covering vector d > 0 as
ELCP (d, q,M) , {z0 ∈R+, z ∈R
m
+
| q + dz0 +Mz ≥ 0 and z
⊺(q + dz0 +Mz) = 0}.
Note that ELCP (d, q,M) is composed of a polyhedral set intersected with one nonlinear com-
plementarity constraint. Throughout the paper whenever we refer to vertices, edges and rays
of ELCP (e, q,M) we mean the vertices, edges and rays of the polyhedral set associated with
ELCP (e, q,M). We assume that ELCP (d, q,M) is nondegenerate, that is that the polyhedral
set associated with it is nondegenerate4. Let (z¯0, z¯) ∈ ELCP (d, q,M), w¯ = q + dz¯0 +Mz¯, and let k
be the the number of positive entries in (z¯0, z¯, w¯). By the nondegeneracy assumption, k is equal to
either m (in which case (z¯0, z¯) is a vertex of ELCP (d, q,M)), or m+ 1 (in which case it is a point
on an edge of ELCP (d, q,M)). If a vertex of ELCP (d, q,M) is contained in an edge, we say that
the vertex is an endpoint of the edge. If an edge of ELCP (d, q,M) is unbounded then it corresponds
to a ray of ELCP (d, q,M), which can be presented as{[
z0
z
]
|
[
z0
z
]
=
[
z¯0
z¯
]
+
[
u¯0
u¯
]
λ for all λ ≥ 0
}
(2)
where
(z¯0, z¯) is a vertex of ELCP (d, q,M),
u¯ ∈ SOL(du¯0,M), u¯0 ∈ {0, 1} and (u¯0, u¯) 6= 0,
z¯⊺(du¯0 +Mu¯) = 0 and u¯
⊺(q + dz¯0 +Mz¯) = 0.
4There is no loss of generality in this assumption since if it is not satisfied, we perturb q by applying standard linear
programming techniques.
5Consider the ray of ELCP (d, q,M) with z¯ = 0, z¯0 = −min1≤i≤m qi, u¯0 = 1, u¯ = 0. We call
this ray the primary ray, and its corresponding endpoint vertex the initial vertex. Any other ray of
ELCP (d, q,M), can be characterized as
(z¯0, z¯) is a vertex of ELCP (d, q,M), (4a)
u¯ ∈ SOL(du¯0,M) \ {0}, u¯0 ∈ {0, 1} and e
⊺u¯ = 1 whenever u¯0 = 0, (4b)
z¯⊺(du¯0 +Mu¯) = 0 and u¯
⊺(q + dz¯0 +Mz¯) = 0. (4c)
We call such a ray, a secondary ray. We denote the set of all secondary rays of ELCP (d, q,M) by
SR(d, q,M) , {(z¯0, z¯, u¯0, u¯) satisfying (4a)–(4c)}.
Note that a secondary ray (z¯0, z¯, u¯0, u¯) has two components, a vertex (z¯0, z¯) of ELCP (d, q,M) and
what we call a secondary direction (u¯0, u¯) as defined in (4b). Specifically, we denote the set of all
secondary directions of ELCP (d, q,M) as
SD(d,M) , {(u¯0, u¯) satisfying (4b)}.
We distinguish between two types of secondary directions (and rays), according to whether u¯0 = 0,
which we call a type 0 secondary direction, or u¯0 = 1, which we call a type 1 secondary direction.
Specifically, for k = 0, 1, we denote the set of all type k secondary directions of ELCP (d, q,M) by
SDk(d,M) , {(u¯0, u¯) ∈ SD(d, q,M) | u¯0 = k}.
Similarly, for k = 0, 1, we we denote the set of all type k secondary rays of ELCP (d, q,M) by
SRk(d, q,M) , {(z¯0, z¯, u¯0, u¯) ∈ SR(d, q,M) | u¯0 = k}.
Starting with the initial vertex of ELCP (d, q,M), the generic Lemke(d) algorithm traces a unique5
finite path of adjacent vertices of ELCP (d, q,M), terminating with either a solution to LCP (q,M) or
with a secondary ray of ELCP (d, q,M). Specifically, the algorithm ends with either a vertex (z¯0, z¯) of
ELCP (d, q,M) with z¯0 = 0 (so z¯ ∈ SOL(q,M)), or with a secondary ray (z¯0, z¯, u¯0, u¯) ∈ SR(d, q,M)
with z¯0 > 0. We say that Lemke(d) resolves a given LCP (q,M) if either it ends with z¯ ∈ SOL(q,M),
or if the terminal secondary ray can certify that SOL(q,M) = ∅. Whenever Lemke(d) resolves
LCP (q,M) we say that LCP (q,M) is Lemke(d)-resolvable.
Ever since the introduction of the Lemke algorithm [Lem65], extensive research efforts focused
on identifying classes of matrices M for which LCP (q,M) is Lemke(d)-resolvable for all q. In the
following we discuss two major groups of matrices containing almost all known classes of matrices
M for which LCP (d, q,M) is Lemke(d)-resolvable for all q.
The first group is based on the idea that if SR(d, q,M) = ∅, then Lemke(d) outputs z¯ ∈
SOL(q,M). Specifically, we consider the class of d-regular matrices (see [CPS92], 3.9.20) as de-
fined below.
Definition Given M ∈ Rm×m and d ∈ Rm
++
, we say that M is d-regular if SOL(dτ,M) = {0}
for all τ ∈R+. We denote the class of d-regular matrices by R(d).
5The uniqueness is due to the assumption that ELCP (d, q,M) is nondegenerate.
6It follows that if M ∈ R(d), then for all q, ELCP (d, q,M) has no secondary directions and thus
no secondary rays. That is, SR(d, q,M) = ∅ for all q. Recalling that Lemke(d) terminates in a finite
number of steps with either z¯ ∈ SOL(q,M) or with (z¯0, z¯, u¯0, u¯) ∈ SR(d, q,M), we conclude that
whenever M ∈ R(d), LCP (q,M) is Lemke(d)-resolvable for all q.
Remark6 It is well known that M belongs to the strictly semimonotone matrix class (which is
denoted by E) if and only if SOL(q,M) = {0} for all q ≥ 0 (see [CPS92],3.9.11). Thus, it follows
that for all d > 0,E ⊂ R(d) . In addition, E properly contains the strictly copositive matrix class
(C), and the class of all matrices whose principle minors are positive (P). Thus, we observe that
LCP (q,M) with M in E,C or P is Lemke(d)-resolvable for all d > 0 and all q.
The second group includes classes of matrices for which SR(d, q,M) 6= ∅ implies that SOL(q,M) =
∅. Specifically, most matrix classes with this property that have been identified in the LCP literature
share the following property:
SD1(d,M) = ∅ (5a)
SR0(d, q,M) 6= ∅ ⇒ FEA(q,M) = ∅. (5b)
We denote by USR(d) (for useful secondary rays) the class of all matrices M for which (5a)-(5b) are
satisfied for all q ≥ 0 .
The class of matrices that satisfy (5a) is defined below.
Definition Given M ∈ Rm×m and d ∈ Rm
++
, we say that M ∈ Rm×m is d-semiregular if
SOL(d,M) = {0}. We denote the class of d-semiregular matrices by R0(d).
Remarks
1. While the term ‘d-semiregular’ is introduced here for the first time, the class itself has been
introduced in [Gar73] under the name E∗(d).
2. IfM ∈ USR(d) then the existence of a secondary ray for ELCP (d, q,M) implies that SOL(q,M) =
∅. Hence, any LCP (q,M) with M ∈ USR(d) is Lemke(d)-resolvable for all q.
3. R(d) ⊂ USR(d).
4. It is well known that M belongs to the semimonotone matrix class (which is denoted by E0) if
and only if SOL(q,M) = {0} for all q > 0 (see [CPS92],3.9.3). Thus, it follows that E0 ⊂ R0(d)
for all d > 0. In addition, E0 properly includes the copositive matrix class (C0), and the class
of all matrices whose principle minors are nonnegative (P0).
5. There are two well known classes of matrices, L and Q0 ∩ P0, which are known to be in
USR(d) for all d > 0. In particular, major matrix classes, including Column Sufficient (CSU),
Row Sufficient (RSU), and Sufficient (SU), are subsets of P0 ∩ Q0, while Copositive Plus
(C+0 ), and Copositive Star (C
∗
0
) are subsets of L. Hence, LCP (q,M) where M belongs to
any of these classes of matrices is Lemke(d)-resolvable. For a discussion of these and other
Lemke(d)-resolvable classes see [CPS92] and [Mur88]. Figure 1 at the end of Section 5 depicts
the relationship among these classes.
6The definitions of all the matrix classes which are mentioned in this paper can be found in [CPS92].
73 Bimatrix Games
Let A,B ∈Rm×n be the cost matrices of the row and column players of a bimatrix game. A Nash
equilibrium of this game is a pair of vectors x ∈Rm, y ∈Rn (representing mixed strategies for the
row and column players respectively), satisfying
Ay ≥ e(x⊺Ay), B⊺x ≥ e(x⊺By), e⊺x = e⊺y = 1, x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0.
To simplify the presentation we restrict our attention to symmetric bimatrix games where A = B⊺. In
particular, it has been shown in the seminal paper [Nas51] that every symmetric bimatrix game has a
symmetric Nash equilibrium (that is, a Nash equilibrium where x = y). In addition, it is well known
that the Nash equilibria for any bimatrix game with cost matrices A,B (which can be assumed,
without loss of generality, to be positive) can be easily extracted from the symmetric equilibria of
the symmetric bimatrix game with cost matrix
(
0 A
B⊺ 0
)
.
Given C ∈Rn×n, we denote by SG(C) the symmetric bimatrix game where the row and column
players’ cost matrix is C. We say that x ∈Rn is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of SG(C) if
Cx ≥ e(x⊺Cx), (6a)
x ≥ 0, (6b)
e⊺x = 1. (6c)
Note that since x⊺Cx =
∑m
i=1 xi(Ci.x), (6a)–(6b) imply
xi(Ci.x− x
⊺Cx) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n. (9d)
We denote by SNE(C) the set of symmetric Nash equilibria of SG(C). We refer to the problem of
finding a symmetric Nash equilibrium for SG(C) as solving SG(C).
There are several ways of formulating the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix
game as a linear complementarity problem ([CD68], [Eav71], [MZ91], [Sav06]). Here we adopt the
reduction in [Sav06], where the problem of computing a symmetric Nash equilibrium of a symmetric
bimatrix game is presented as a linear complementarity problem. In particular, let C be the cost
matrix of a symmetric bimatrix game. Without loss of generality we can assume (by adding a
sufficiently large constant to all the entries of C) that C > 0. Solving SG(C) with C > 0 can be
reduced to LCP (−e, C) as described in [Sav06], and presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Suppose C > 0.
(i) Let z ∈ SOL(−e, C). Then, z 1
e⊺z
∈ SNE(C).
(ii) Let x ∈ SNE(C). Then, x 1
x⊺Cx
∈ SOL(−e, C).
Proof. (i) and (ii) can be easily verified by substitution. 
84 The Complexity Class PPAD
The class PPAD (Polynomial-time Parity Argument Directed), which was introduced in the seminal
paper [Pap94], is a class of problems which can be presented as follows.
Definition Given a directed graph with every node having in-degree and out-degree at most one
described by a polynomial-time computable function f(v) that outputs the predecessor and successor
of a node v, and a node s (which we call the initial source node) with a successor but no predecessor,
find a node t 6= s which is either a sink (a node with no successor) or a source (a node with no
predecessor), but not both. We call such a graph the PPAD graph associated with the problem.
Many important problems, such as the Brouwer fixed-point problem, the search versions of Smith’s
theorem, the Borsuk-Ulam theorem and, as previously discussed, Nash equilibrium of bimatrix game,
belong to this class [Pap94]. Interestingly, the problems in PPAD are generally believed not to be
NP-hard since it has been shown in [MP91] that if there exists a PPAD problem which is NP-hard
then NP = CoNP . What makes the study of this class attractive is that it has been shown that
several problems within the class (such as the Brouwer fixed-point problem) are PPAD-complete
with strong circumstantial evidence that these problems are not likely to have a polynomial time
algorithm [HPV89].
The PPAD complexity class seems to be a natural framework for analyzing the computational
complexity of Lemke(d)-resolvable LCP (q,M), as the underlying graph of Lemke(d) whose nodes
correspond to the vertices and edges of ELCP (d, q,M) has a structure reminiscent of a PPAD graph.
In particular, given ELCP (d, q,M), we define its associated graph (which we call the Lemke(d) graph
associated with LCP (q,M)), as the directed graph G(d, q,M) whose nodes correspond to the vertices
and edges (including rays) of ELCP (d, q,M). There is an arc (u, v) of G(d, q,M) if and only if either
u corresponds to a vertex of ELCP (d, q,M), v corresponds to an edge of ELCP (d, q,M) and the
vertex corresponding to u is the tail of the edge corresponding to v; or u corresponds to an edge of
ELCP (d, q,M), v corresponds to a vertex of ELCP (d, q,M) and the vertex corresponding to v is
the head of the edge corresponding to v. The orientations of the edges are determined according the
scheme presented in [Tod76]. We identify the node associated with the primary ray of ELCP (d, q,M)
as the required special source node of a PPAD graph. Given (as we assume) that ELCP (d, q,M)
is nondegenerate, we have that every node of G(d, q,M) is incident to at most two edges, and that
there are no isolated nodes. Thus, G(d, q,M) is a nonempty collection of simple directed paths. In
addition, any node incident to only one other node (except for the node associated with the primary
ray) corresponds to either a solution of LCP (q,M) or to a secondary ray of ELCP (d, q,M). Thus, if
for a given LCP (q,M) and a covering vector d, the secondary rays of ELCP (d, q,M) can certify (in
polynomial time in the size of LCP (q,M)) that SOL(q,M) = ∅, we can conclude that LCP (q,M)
is in PPAD. Whenever this is the case, we say that LCP (q,M) is Lemke(d) PPAD-verified.
Indeed, in [Pap94], one of the first examples of a PPAD problem is an LCP (q,M) whereM ∈ P.
While it is customary in the literature of linear complementarity to discuss methods for solving
LCP (q,M) under the assumption that M possesses some special properties, it creates difficulties
from an algorithmic complexity point of view, as verifying these properties may be by itself a hard
problem (e.g. identifying a P matrix is CoNP complete [Cox73]). Thus, in [Pap94], the problem at
hand (which is called P − LCP ) is defined as follows. Given q,M , either find z ∈ SOL(q,M), or
provide a certificate (with size polynomial in the size of the problem) for M 6∈ P. Motivated by the
9discussion in [Pap94] we consider the following generic problem.
Y − LCP (q,M) : Given M ∈Rm×m, q ∈Rm and a matrix class Y, find one of the following:
(1) z ∈ SOL(q,M), (2) a certificate that SOL(q,M) = ∅, (3) a certificate that M 6∈ Y.
We say that Y − LCP (q,M) is Lemke(d)-PPAD-verified if any (z¯0, z¯, u¯0, u¯) ∈ SR(d, q,M) leads
(in polynomial time in the size of ELCP (d, q,M)) to (2) or (3) above.
Remark Following the discussion in section 2, we have that USR(q,M)−LCP (q,M) is Lemke(d)
PPAD-verified and for all q and d > 0. In particular, considering the remarks at the end of Section
2, we can conclude that L ∪ (P0 ∩Q0) − LCP (q,M) is Lemke(d) PPAD-verified and for all q and
d > 0.
5 The generic Lemke(d) linear complementarity problem
As stated in the introduction, it has been established that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium
for a bimatrix game is PPAD-complete. Moreover, since solving any bimatrix game is polynomially
reducible to solving a symmetric bimatrix game, we have that the problem of finding a symmetric
Nash equilibrium for a symmetric bimatrix game, as presented in Section 3, is also PPAD-complete.
In particular, it is shown there that this problem can be represented as an LCP (−e,M) where
M > 0. Since M > 0 implies that M ∈ C (the class of all matrices for which 0 6= x ∈ Rm
+
implies
that x⊺Mx > 0), and considering the remark at the end of the previous section, we conclude that
C− LCP is PPAD-complete as well. In Figure 1, we display the relationship among the classes of
matrices discussed in previous sections. An arrow from a class X to a class Y indicates that X ⊂ Y.
So for any class Y reachable by a directed path from class C in Figure 1 we have that if Y − LCP
is in PPAD then it is PPAD-complete. Note that the class USR(d) (for any d > 0) contains all
the classes of matrices Y identified in the previous section as a classes for which Y − LCP (q,M) is
Lemke(d) PPAD-verified and for all q and d > 0.
PSD
L CSU (augmented)
SU
C+
PD
RSU
PPAD
P
PPAD-complete
BG
P0ŀQ0
PC E
C*
E0
€C0 P0
NP-complete
USR
R (e)
Figure 1
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Next we show how Lemke(d) PPAD-verified linear complementarity problems can be reduced
simply and directly to a symmetric bimatrix game. To achieve this goal, we shall consider the
following generic problem which we call Lemke(d)-LCP(q,M) and denote by LLCP (d, q,M).
LLCP (d, q,M) : Given M ∈ Rm×m, q ∈ Rm, and d ∈ Rm
++
, find either z ∈ SOL(q,M) or
(z¯0, z¯, u¯0, u¯) ∈ SR(d, q,M).
Obviously LLCP (d, q,M) is verified to be in PPAD by G(d, q,M). In the following we shall
show how it is possible to reduce any LLCP (d, q,M), whenever LCP (d,M) is nondegenerate, to a
symmetric bimatrix game. In addition, given d¯ > 0, we shall show, by standard LP perturbation
techniques, that our reduction works for all d in a sufficiently small neighborhood of d¯, and that the
reduction works for all d ∈ R++, except for a finite number of subsets of measure zero. We shall
present our reduction in several steps, where we address the reduction of instances of the following
problem:
Y − LLCP (d, q,M) : Given M ∈ Rm×m, q ∈ Rm, d ∈ Rm
++
and a matrix class Y, find one of
the following.
(1) z ∈ SOL(q,M), (2) (z¯0, z¯, u¯0, u¯) ∈ SR(d, q,M), (3) A certificate that M 6∈ Y.
We start by presenting in Section 6 a simple reduction which is applicable toR(e)−LLCP (e, q,M).
The certificate that we obtain from the bimatrix game whenever M 6∈ R(e) is of the form 0 6= u¯ ∈
SOL(eu¯0,M). So we get either a solution for LCP (q,M) or a secondary direction for ELCP (e, q,M).
Note that at this stage we address only e as a covering vector, and that we do not reach yet our
goal as the reduction may produce secondary directions rather than secondary rays. In Section 7,
we extend the previous reduction to handle R0(e)− LLCP (e, q,M). The certificate that we obtain
from the bimatrix game whenever M 6∈ R0(e) is of the form 0 6= u¯ ∈ SOL(e,M). So we get either
a solution for LCP (q,M), a secondary ray for ELCP (e, q,M), or a type 1 secondary direction for
ELCP (e, q,M). Next, in Section 8, we present a complete reduction of LLCP (e, q,M) under the
assumption that LCP (e,M) is nondegenerate if SOL(e,M) 6= {0}. Finally, in Section 9, we extend
the reductions in the previous sections to a general covering vector d > 0 for which LCP (d,M) is
nondegenerate if SOL(d,M) 6= {0}.
6 Reducing R(e)− LCP (q,M) to a symmetric bimatrix game
In this section we present a simple direct reduction of R(e)−LCP (e, q,M). In particular, given q,M ,
we construct a symmetric bimatrix game whose symmetric Nash equilibrium points correspond one-
to-one to either z¯ ∈ SOL(q,M) or a certificate for M 6∈ R(e) in the form of 0 6= u¯ ∈ SOL(eu¯0,M)
where u¯0 ∈ {0, 1}, so (u¯0, u¯) ∈ SD(e,M).
Given LCP (q,M) with M ∈ Rm×m, q ∈ Rm and a covering vector e, we set n = m + 1 and a
symmetric bimatrix game whose cost matrix C(q,M) is
C(q,M) ,
[
M q + e
0 1
]
. (7)
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Given C(q,M) as above, we denote any symmetric equilibrium point x ∈ SNE(C) as x ,
(
y
t
)
,
where y ∈Rm and t ∈R. Given SNE(C(q,M)), we partition it to
SNE+(C(q,M)) ,
{[
y
t
]
∈ SNE(C(q,M)) | t > 0
}
,
and
SNE0(C(q,M)) ,
{[
y
t
]
∈ SNE(C(q,M)) | t = 0
}
,
In the next theorem we establish a one-to-one correspondence between the symmetric Nash equilibria
of SG(C(q,M)) which use with positive probability the last column of C(q,M), and the set of
solutions to LCP (q,M). We follow this with a theorem that establishes a one-to-one correspondence
between the symmetric Nash equilibria of G(C(q,M)) which are not using the last column of C(q,M)
and the secondary directions of ELCP (e, q,M).
Theorem 2
(i) Given x¯ =
[
y¯
t¯
]
∈ SNE+(C(q,M)), let z¯ = y¯
1
t¯
. Then, z¯ ∈ SOL(q,M).
(ii) Given z¯ ∈ SOL(q,M), let t¯ = 1
e⊺z¯+1
, y¯ = z¯t¯. Then, x¯ =
[
y¯
t¯
]
∈ SNE+(C(q,M)).
Proof. Throughout the proof we denote C(q,M) by C.
(i) Since t¯ > 0, then, by (9d) (with i = n), t¯ = x¯⊺Cx¯. Thus, by (6a)–(6b), My¯ + (q + e)t¯ ≥
et¯, y¯ ≥ 0. Dividing by t¯, we get Mz¯ + q ≥ 0, z¯ ≥ 0. In addition, by (9d) (for i = 1, . . . ,m),
y¯i(Mi.y¯ + qit¯ + t¯ − t¯) = 0, so dividing by t¯
2, substituting for z¯, and summing over m, we get
0 =
∑m
i=1 z¯i(M.iz¯ + qi) = z¯
⊺(Mz¯ + q).
(ii) By (1a), and setting t¯ = 1
e⊺z+1
, y¯ = z¯t¯, we have
[
M q + e
0 1
] [
z¯t¯
t¯
]
≥
(
e
1
)(
z¯t¯
t¯
)
≥
(
0
0
)
and obviously (e⊺z¯)t¯+ t¯ = (e⊺z¯ + 1)t¯ = 1. In addition,
x¯⊺Cx¯ = y¯⊺(My¯ + qt¯+ et¯) + t¯2 = t¯2(z¯⊺(Mz¯ + q) + e) + 1)
Thus, since by (1b), z¯⊺(Mz¯ + q) = 0, x¯⊺Cx¯ = t¯2(z¯⊺e + 1) = t¯. Hence, x =
(
y¯
t¯
)
satisfies
(6a)–(6c), and since t¯ > 0, we have x¯ ∈ SNE+(C(q,M)). 
Theorem 3
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(i) If
[
y¯
0
]
∈ SNE0(C(q,M)), then y¯ ∈ SOL(eτ,M)/{0} for some τ¯ ≥ 0.
(ii) Let u¯ ∈ SOL(eτ¯ ,M)/{0} for some τ¯ ≥ 0. Then, setting y¯ = u¯ 1
e⊺u¯
, x¯ =
[
y¯
0
]
∈ SNE0(C(q,M)).
Proof. Throughout the proof we denote C(q,M) by C.
(i) By (6a)–(6b), My¯ ≥ e(y¯⊺My¯), 0 ≥ y¯⊺My¯, y¯ ≥ 0, and e⊺y¯ = 1. Setting τ¯ = −y¯⊺My¯, we get
My¯ + eτ¯ ≥ 0, 0 6= y¯ ≥ 0. Moreover, since e⊺y¯ = 1, we have (by (9d)) that y¯⊺(My¯ + eτ¯) = 0,
concluding that y¯ ∈ SOL(eτ¯ ,M)/{0} for some τ¯ ≥ 0.
(ii) Noticing that u¯ 6= 0 and by (1a)–(1b),
My¯ ≥ e(−τ¯), y¯⊺(My¯ + e(−τ¯)) = 0, y¯ ≥ 0.
Thus,
[
y¯
0
]
satisfy (6a)–(6b). Noticing that e⊺u¯ = 1, completes the proof. 
Given LCP (q,M), and combining Theorems 2 and 3, we can construct a symmetric bimatrix game
where any symmetric Nash equilibrium point corresponds to either a solution for LCP (q,M), or a
secondary direction for ELCP (e, q,M). Specifically, given q 6≥ 0 and M , consider the symmetric
bimatrix game whose cost matrix is C(q,M). Let
[
y¯
t¯
]
∈ SNE(C(q,M)), and let τ¯ be its expected
cost. We then conclude that:
1 t¯ > 0. By Theorem 2-(i), 1
t¯
y¯ ∈ SOL(q,M),
2 t¯ = 0. By Theorem 3-(i), y¯ ∈ SOL(eτ¯ ,M) \ {0} for some τ¯ ≥ 0,
1.1 τ¯ = 0. Then, y¯ ∈ SOL(0,M) with e⊺y¯ = 1, so y¯ ∈ SD0(d, q,M),
1.2 τ¯ > 0, Then, y¯ 1
τ¯
∈ SOL(e,M), so y¯ 1
τ¯
∈ SD1(e, q,M).
So the symmetric bimatrix game SG(C) generates either a solution for LCP (q,M) or a secondary
direction for ELCP (e, q,M).
Remarks
1. Note that R(e)− LLCP (e, q,M) is also reduced to SG(C(q,M)).
2. The class of all matrices M for which LCP (q,M) is guaranteed to have a solution for all q is
called Q. The largest known class Y which is contained in Q and for which it is known that
Y − LCP (q,M) is Lemke(e)-resolvable, is R(e).
3. Since P,C ⊂ E ⊂ R(e), the reduction is applicable to Y−LCP (q,M), where Y is P,C or E.
Note that LCP (q,M) has a unique solution for all q if and only ifM ∈ P, and that LCP (q,M)
has a unique solution for all q ≥ 0 if and only if M ∈ E.
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7 Reducing R0(e)−LLCP (e, q,M) to a symmetric bimatrix game
In this section we consider R0(e) − LLCP (e, q,M) which brings us closer to achieving our goal of
reducing any LLCP (e, q,M) to a symmetric bimatrix game. In particular, given q,M , we construct a
symmetric bimatrix game whose symmetric Nash equilibrium points correspond one-to-one to either
the solutions of LCP (q,M), the secondary rays of ELCP (e, q,M), or certificates for M 6∈ R0(e) in
the form of 0 6= u¯ ∈ SOL(e,M) which correspond to a type 1 secondary directions of ELCP (e, q,M).
For that purpose we introduce the augmented problem LCP (q˜, M˜) associated with LCP (q,M),
where
M˜ =
[
1 −e⊺
e M
]
, q˜ =
[
β
q
]
,
and β > e⊺z¯ for any vertex (not necessarily feasible) (z¯0, z¯) of ELCP (e, q,M).
Remarks
1. It is a standard result in LP theory that if the entries in q,M are rational then β is of size
polynomial in the size of LCP (q,M), and that β can be computed in time polynomial in the
size of LCP (q,M).
2. Augmented LCP systems where M˜11 is equal to 0 (see [CPS92]) or −1 [Tod73] are used in the
LCP literature to eliminate secondary rays. Such augmentations do not work in our case since
the reduction of LCP (q˜, M˜) to a symmetric bimatrix game would yield a pure Nash equilibrium
(using with probability 1 the strategy corresponding to the first column of M˜) which yields
no information about the solution (or lack thereof) of the original LCP (q,M). To avoid this
possibility, we need M˜11 > 0, hence the choice of 1.
In the following theorem we establish the relationship between LCP (q,M) and LCP (q˜, M˜).
Theorem 4
(i)
[
0
z¯
]
∈ SOL(q˜, M˜) if and only if z¯ ∈ SOL(q,M).
(ii) If
[
z˜0
z˜
]
∈ SOL(q˜, M˜) where z˜0 > 0, then there exists (z¯0, z¯, u¯0, u¯) ∈ SR(e, q,M) and λ¯ > 0
such that [
z˜0
z˜
]
=
[
z¯0
z¯
]
+ λ¯
[
u¯0
u¯
]
.
(iii) Let (z¯0, z¯, u¯0, u¯) ∈ SR(e, q,M). Then there exists λ¯ such that
[
z¯0
z¯
]
+ λ¯
[
u¯0
u¯
]
∈ SOL(q˜, M˜ ).
Proof.
(i) The ‘only if’ direction is obviously true. The ‘if’ direction is true because of the nondegeneracy
assumption (so z˜ is a a vertex of LCP (q,M)) and by the definition of β.
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(ii) Let
[
z˜0
z˜
]
∈ SOL(q˜, M˜ ) where z˜0 > 0. Then,
q + ez˜0 +Mz˜ ≥ 0, z˜ ≥ 0, z˜0 ≥ 0, z˜
⊺(q + ez˜0 +Mz˜) = 0, z˜0(β + z˜0 − e
⊺z˜) = 0,
which implies that (z˜0, z˜) ∈ ELCP (e, q,M) and (since z˜0, > 0) e
⊺z˜ = β + z˜0. However, by the
definition of β, (z˜0, z˜) must be a point on a secondary ray of ELCP (e, q,M). That is, there
exists λ¯ > 0 and (z¯0, z¯, u¯0, u¯) ∈ SR(e, q,M) such that
[
z˜0
z˜
]
=
[
z¯0
z¯
]
+ λ¯
[
u¯0
u¯
]
.
(iii) By the definition of SR(e, q,M), we have that for all λ ≥ 0,
[
z¯0
z¯
]
+ λ
[
u¯0
u¯
]
satisfies all the
constraints of LCP (q˜, M˜) except possibly for the last constraint. However, since −z¯0+e
⊺z¯ < β,
u¯ 6= 0, u¯0 ∈ {0, 1}, and −u¯0+e
⊺u¯ > 0, setting λ¯ = β+z¯0−e
⊺z¯
−u¯0+e⊺u¯
yields −(z¯0+ λ¯u¯0)+e
⊺(z¯+ λ¯u¯) = β
which, considering that λ¯ > 0, completes the proof. 
Remark The extraction of either a solution or a secondary ray from a secondary direction as
described in the proof of Theorem 4-(ii) can be done by standard LP technique that can be executed
in strongly polynomial time (that is, the required number of elementary calculations such as additions,
multiplications, divisions and comparisons is bounded above by a polynomial function of m).
Next, we show that M˜ 6∈ R(e) implies that M 6∈ R0(e), which allows us to apply the reduction
of the previous section to the augmented problem.
Theorem 5 If 0 6=
[
u¯0
u¯
]
∈ SOL(eτ, M˜ ) for some τ ≥ 0, then u¯0+ τ¯ > 0 and
1
u¯0+τ¯
u¯ ∈ SOL(e,M).
Proof. By the premise of the theorem there exists u¯0 ≥ 0, u¯ ≥ 0, u¯0 + e
⊺u¯ > 0, such that
[
1 −e⊺
e M
] [
u¯0
u¯
]
+
[
1
e
]
τ¯ ≥
[
0
0
]
, and
[u¯0 u¯
⊺]
([
1 −e⊺
e M
] [
u¯0
u¯
]
+
[
1
e
]
τ¯
)
=
[
0
0
]
.
Thus,
u¯0 − e
⊺u¯+ τ¯ ≥ 0, (8a)
Mu¯+ e(u¯0 + τ¯) ≥ 0, u¯ ≥ 0, (8b)
u¯⊺(Mu¯+ e(u¯0 + τ¯)) = 0. (8c)
By (8a) we have that u¯0 + τ¯ > 0 (as otherwise u¯ = 0, u¯0 = 0 contrary to the assumption). Thus,
from (8b) and (8c) we have that 1
u¯0+τ¯
u¯ ∈ SOL(e,M). 
Combining Theorems 4 and 5, and recalling the definition of the class R0(e), we get that, given
LCP (q,M), we can construct a symmetric bimatrix game where any symmetric Nash equilibrium
point corresponds to a solution of LCP (q,M), a secondary ray of ELCP (e, q,M) or a type 1 direction
of ELCP (e, q,M).
15
Specifically, consider the symmetric bimatrix game whose cost matrix is C(q˜, M˜ ) =

 1 −e
⊺ −β + 1
e M q + e
0 0 1

.
Let

 z¯0z¯
t¯

 ∈ SNE(C(q˜, M˜)), and let τ¯ be its expected cost. We then conclude that:
1 t¯ > 0. By Theorem 2,
[
z¯0
z¯
]
1
t¯
∈ SOL(q˜, M˜ ).
1.1 z¯0 = 0. Then (by Theorem 4-(i)), z¯
1
t¯
∈ SOL(q,M) (a solution to the original problem).
1.2 z¯0 > 0. Then (by Theorem 4-(ii) and the remark following its proof), we can obtain (in
strongly polynomial time) (z¯0, z¯, u¯0, u¯) ∈ SR(e, q,M) (a secondary ray of ELCP (e, q,M)).
2 t¯ = 0. By Theorem 3. 0 6=
[
u¯0
u¯
]
∈ SOL(eτ¯ , M˜ ) where τ¯ ≥ 0. Thus, by Theorem 5,
0 6= u¯ 1
u¯0+τ¯
∈ SOL(e,M) (so
[
1
u¯ 1
u¯0+τ¯
]
∈ SD1(e, q,M) (a type 1 secondary direction of
ELCP (e, q,M)).
8 Handling nondegenerate type 1 secondary directions
In this section we show that if 0 6= u¯ ∈ SOL(e,M) is nondegenerate, then we can compute, in strongly
polynomial time, (z¯0, z¯), a vertex of ELCP (q,M) such that if z¯0 > 0 then (z¯0, z¯, 1, u¯) ∈ SR1(e, q,M)
(that is, a type 1 secondary ray).
Let u¯ be a non-zero, nondegenerate solution for LCP (e,M). Setting v¯ =Mu¯+e, let α = {i | u¯i >
0} and α¯ = {i | v¯i > 0}. Note that by the nondegeneracy assumption α ∪ α¯ = {1, . . . ,m} and Mαα
is nonsingular. Now, we set
[
zˆα
wˆα¯
]
=
[
Mαα 0
Mα¯α I
]−1 [
qα
qα¯
]
,
[
zˆα¯
wˆα
]
=
[
0
0
]
,
which results in
wˆ = q +Mzˆ, zˆ⊺wˆ = 0, u¯⊺(q +Mzˆ), zˆ⊺(Mu¯).
Thus, if zˆ, wˆ ≥ 0 then zˆ ∈ SOL(q,M). Otherwise, since u¯α > 0 and v¯α¯ > 0, for sufficiently large
λ > 0 we have that [
zˆα
wˆα¯
]
+ λ
[
u¯α
v¯α¯
]
≥
[
0
0
]
Letting λ¯ be the smallest λ satisfying the inequality above, and setting z¯0 = λ¯, z¯ = zˆ + λ¯u¯ we get
that (z¯0, z¯, 1, u¯) ∈ SR1(e, q,M). Note that constructing (z¯0, z¯) whenever a nondegenerate
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9 Extensions
In this section we show how to extend our reductions whenever a general positive covering vector is
used rather than e. The key to the results in this section is the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Given d ∈ Rm
++
, let D be the diagonal matrix with Dii = di. Then, (z¯0, z¯) ∈
ELCP (d, q,M) if and only if (z¯0,Dz¯) ∈ ELCP (e,D
−1q,D−1MD−1).
Proof. The proposition is easily verified by observing that
q + dz0 +Mz ≥ 0, z ≥ 0 if and only if D
−1(q + dz0 +MD
−1Dz) ≥ 0, Dz ≥ 0,
and z⊺(q + dz0 +Mz) = 0 if and only if z
⊺DD−1(q + dz0 +MD
−1Dz) = 0. 
Corollary 7 Given d ∈Rm
++
, let D be the diagonal matrix with Dii = di. Then,
(i) z¯ ∈ LCP (q,M) if and only if Dz¯ ∈ LCP (D−1q,D−1MD−1).
(ii) M ∈ R(d) if and only if D−1MD−1 ∈ R(e).
(iii) M ∈ R0(d) if and only if D
−1MD−1 ∈ R0(e).
Proof.
(i) Results from Proposition 6 by considering z¯0 = 0.
(ii)-(ii) Result directly from (i) and the definitions of R(d) and R0(d).
By Proposition 6 and Corollary 7 it can be readily verified that the results of Section 6 can be ex-
tended to R(d)−LCP (q,M) by considering R(e)−LCP (D−1q,D−1MD−1). Similarly, the results of
Section 7 can be extended toR0(d)−LLCP (d, q,M) by consideringR0(e)−LLCP (e,D
−1q,D−1MD−1).
Finally, given that LCP (d,M) is nondegenerate we can (by Proposition 6, Corollary 7, and the results
of sections 7 and 8) reduce any LLCP (d, q,M) where LCP (d,M) is nondegenerate to a bimatrix
game whose cost matrix is
C =

 1 −e
⊺ −β
∏m
i=1 di + 1
e D−1MD−1 D−1q + e
0 0 1

 .
Let

 z¯0z¯
t¯

 ∈ SNE(C). Based on Proposition 6 and Corollary 7 we replace z¯ with D−1z¯ and proceed
to recover a ‘solution’ to LLCP (d.q.M) by following the steps prescribed in sections 7 and 8.
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10 Concluding remarks
1. The main result of this paper is that for almost any given d ∈Rm
++
, q ∈Rm,M ∈Rm×m, it
is possible to effectively set up a symmetric bimatrix game whose Nash equilibria correspond
one-to-one to all the endpoints (excluding the one corresponding to the primary ray) of the
directed graph associated with LCP (q,M) and the Lemke method with a covering vector d.
The only condition is that any Nash equilibrium corresponding to a type 1 secondary direction
(that is a solution for LCP (d,M)), has to be nondegenerate. Note that if this is not the case,
we can perturb (by standard LP techniques) d to a dˆ which, when used as the covering vector,
will guarantee that the reduction will work. This observation also means that for any given
M, q the reduction is workable for all covering vectors d ∈Rm
++
, with the exception of a finite
number of sets of measure 0.
2. As a consequence of the main result as specified above, the reduction will resolve any LCP (q,M)
which is Lemke(d) PPAD-verified. Note that all the major matrix classes of M which are
known to be Lemke(d) resolvable for all q are actually known to be Lemke(d) PPAD-verified
(and typically for all d ∈ Rm
++
). These classes (which are all subsets of USR(d)) and their
relationships are depicted in Figure 1.
3. The direct reductions which are presented in this paper highlight the importance of the problem
of 2-NASH within mathematical programming. In a sense, we show that as any LP can be
directly reduced to zero-sum game (see [Dan51] and [Adl12]), it is analogously possible to
directly reduce any LCP (q,M) which is Lemke(d) PPAD-verified to a 2-NASH problem, thus
showing that many of the results regarding such problems are relevant to LCP theory.
4. The reductions in sections 6, 7, and 8 are simple and easy to execute. Thus, any algorithm that
is applicable to bimatrix games can be directly used to solve instances of RSU(d)−LCP (q,M)
and LLCP (d, q,M). Also, considering that the proposed reductions are bijections, algorithms
with a variety of goals, such as enumerating all, or specific subsets of Nash equilibrium points
can be applied for similar goals regarding the solutions of linear complementarity problems for
which our reductions are applicable. It should be noted that there is a vast literature covering
the subjects of computing and enumerating Nash equilibria of bimatrix games (see e.g. the
surveys in [vSt02],[vSt07] and the papers introduced in [vSt10]).
5. Over the years several refinements of Nash equilibrium have been introduced. In particu-
lar, some results regarding the existence and computation of these refinements have been
established. In [MT98] some of these refinements are generalized to LCPs. The reduction
of LCP (q,M) which are Lemke(d) PPAD-verified (e.g. where M ∈ USR(d)) to symmetric
NASH-2, provides us with a tool to investigate analogous questions with respect to the general-
ized refinements to such LCPs. For example, in a forthcoming paper, we demonstrate such an
analysis by proving that any LCP (q,M) with M ∈ R(e) has a proper solution. As a corollary
of this analysis we prove that the (unique) solution of LCP (q,M) where M ∈ P is proper and
thus settle a conjecture posed in [MT98] (where it is proved for 2× 2 matrices).
6. The simple reductions proposed in this paper allow us, whenever applicable, to potentially
gain additional insight into the nature of models represented by these LCPs. This seems to be
especially useful for economic models such as market equilibrium.
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